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Abstract
Background: Government alcohol monopolies were created in North America and Scandinavia to limit health and
social problems. The Swedish monopoly, Systembolaget, reports to a health ministry and controls the sale of all alcoholic
beverages with > 3.5% alcohol/volume for off-premise consumption, within a public health mandate. Elsewhere, alcohol
monopolies are being dismantled with evidence of increased consumption and harms. We describe innovative
modelling techniques to estimate health outcomes in scenarios involving Systembolaget being replaced by 1)
privately owned liquor stores, or 2) alcohol sales in grocery stores. The methods employed can be applied in
other jurisdictions and for other policy changes.
Methods: Impacts of the privatisation scenarios on pricing, outlet density, trading hours, advertising and marketing
were estimated based on Swedish expert opinion and published evidence. Systematic reviews were conducted to
estimate impacts on alcohol consumption in each scenario. Two methods were applied to estimate harm impacts: (i)
alcohol attributable morbidity and mortality were estimated utilising the International Model of Alcohol Harms and
Policies (InterMAHP); (ii) ARIMA methods to estimate the relationship between per capita alcohol consumption and
specific types of alcohol-related mortality and crime.
Results: Replacing government stores with private liquor stores (Scenario 1) led to a 20.0% (95% CI, 15.3–24.7) increase
in per capita consumption. Replacement with grocery stores (Scenario 2) led to a 31.2% (25.1–37.3%) increase. With
InterMAHP there were 763 or + 47% (35–59%) and 1234 or + 76% (60–92%) more deaths per year, for Scenarios 1 and 2
respectively. With ARIMA, there were 850 (334–1444) more deaths per year in Scenario 1 and 1418 more in Scenario 2
(543–2505). InterMAHP also estimated 10,859 or + 29% (22–34%) and 16,118 or + 42% (35–49%) additional hospital
stays per year respectively.
Conclusions: There would be substantial adverse consequences for public health and safety were Systembolaget to
be privatised. We demonstrate a new combined approach for estimating the impact of alcohol policies on consumption
and, using two alternative methods, alcohol-attributable harm. This approach could be readily adapted to other policies
and settings. We note the limitation that some significant sources of uncertainty in the estimates of harm impacts were
not modelled.
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Background
Rationale for present study
Government monopolies for the sale or distribution
of alcohol exist in North America (USA and Canada),
Northern Europe and India. The North American alcohol
monopolies were set up in the 1920’s and 1930’s, in most
cases following the repeal of prohibition. Today, 17 US
states control sales of spirits and/or wine at the wholesale
level and 13 of these also at the retail level [1]. Retail
“monopolies” for all alcohol beverages remain in twelve of
Canada’s thirteen regional jurisdictions [2], though, in-
creasingly, sales of alcohol are also being allowed in pri-
vate stores and even grocery stores in some provinces [3].
In the Nordic countries, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and
Finland have state alcohol retail monopolies for higher
strength beers, wine and spirits. The state monopolies on
import, distribution and wholesale distribution in these
countries were abolished in Sweden and Finland in 1995
after entering EU, and in Norway in 1996 [4].
The Swedish government alcohol monopoly, Systembola-
get, was established as a state owned national company in
1955 with a monopoly on the retail sale of alcoholic bever-
ages in Sweden with a strength greater than 3.5%. System-
bolaget has an explicit mandate to reduce alcohol-related
harm, operates without a profit motive and reports to the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. With increasing
pressure to privatise or gradually dismantle government
monopolies in other countries [5–7], it is important to
use best available research evidence to estimate the
likely impacts on public health and safety that would
ensue under different privatisation scenarios. The purpose
of the present study is to estimate the likely public health
consequences were Systembolaget to be abolished, an issue
last addressed in a 2008 study reported both by Norström
et al. [8] and Holder et al. [9]. We present an innovative ap-
proach to estimating the changes in alcohol consumption
and the associated public health burden that would result
from two alternative policy scenarios in Sweden.
Swedish alcohol policy context
The legal age limit for selling alcoholic beverages off-
premise (at Systembolaget) is 20 years and is 18 years for
on-premise sales (restaurants, bars, cafes). Systembolaget
currently runs 436 retail stores and licenses about 500
agents in rural areas to handle local distribution of al-
cohol. Rural agent stores account for less than 1 % of
all sales. Systembolaget stores mostly open for 9 h on
weekdays, for five hours on Saturdays and are closed
on Sundays. Retail prices are based on the wholesale
purchase price plus a basic fixed surcharge and a 19%
surcharge on purchase price before alcohol taxes. Prices
are fixed to be the same in all stores. Beer up to 3.5%
alcohol by volume can also be sold in ordinary grocery
stores, convenience stores and gasoline stations. Alcohol
purchases over the Internet from foreign sellers, some
with Swedish stakeholders, have been made legal but sales
from this source remain below 1% of total sales [10].
In the Swedish parliament, all parties, with varying
degrees of enthusiasm, support restrictive alcohol pol-
icies in order to limit alcohol consumption and harm.
These policies include high alcohol taxes, a state owned
retail monopoly, high age limits for alcohol purchase,
restricting the number of licensed premises for alcohol
serving and restricting marketing for alcohol. High
alcohol taxes and the alcohol retail monopoly have
received increased popular support in the last decade
[11]. A number of other Swedish monopolies have been
dismantled during the past decades, such as the rail-
ways, pharmacies and vehicle inspections. The gam-
bling monopoly is also likely to be abolished soon. The
alcohol retail monopoly thus has increasingly become
the exception to the rule.
Swedish alcohol consumption and related harm
Alcohol consumption has declined in Sweden from a
peak in consumption in 2004 of 10.5 l per person above
15 years of age, to 9.2 l in 2016 based on official alcohol
sales data [10]. Drinking among young people has gone
down, while consumption among older people, above
65 years, has increased. The National Board of Health
and Welfare estimate that alcohol-related mortality in-
creased between 1990 to 2005 but has since decreased.
Over this period estimated hospital stays for alcohol-related
illness have increased slightly but steadily.
Previous studies of privatisation of alcohol retail
monopolies
A group under the auspices of the US Centers for Disease
Control conducted a systematic review of alcohol retail
privatisation events up to December 2010 [12]. Following
criteria for design suitability and validity, 17 studies of 12
privatisation events were selected for the review. The me-
dian increase in per capita sales of privatised beverages
was 44.4% over all studies, ranging from 0 to 305%. More
recently, studies of the partial privatization of alcohol in
British Columbia, Canada over a period of a few years, in-
dicated that an increasing proportion of liquor stores in
private ownership assessed across 89 regions was associ-
ated with increased alcohol consumption [13, 14], alcohol
attributable mortality [3] and morbidity [15]. In the latter
study, the relationship held after controlling for changes
in alcohol pricing policies.
Opportunity created by new methods for estimating
alcohol attributable harm
Recent developments for estimating alcohol attributable
harm in the Global Burden of Disease studies include
new methods to estimate the continuous prevalence
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distribution of alcohol consumption at different levels
throughout a population [16]. These involve the com-
bined use of both population surveys (which frequently
underestimate total alcohol consumption) and estimates
of per capita alcohol consumption based on official sales
or taxation data. Further, it has been demonstrated that if
one knows the proportion of drinkers in a population and
can estimate overall per capita consumption, it is possible
to reliably estimate the distribution of that consumption
across the whole population e.g. proportions of light,
moderate or heavy drinkers [16]. Specifically, it has been
shown that the within country distribution of alcohol
consumption assessed by self-report survey for more
than 60 countries can be best described by a gamma
distribution.
With the technical advances described below, it is now
possible to estimate changes in alcohol attributable harm
for a given change in the total consumption of alcohol.
Such an approach was applied after estimating changes
in the per capita consumption of alcohol in the Swedish
population under different policy scenarios using the
International Model of Alcohol Harms and Policies (Inter-
MAHP) [17, 18], a new, open access resource to support
the estimation of alcohol attributable harm. InterMAHP is
based on similar principles to those used in Global Burden
of Disease (GBD) estimates for alcohol and was created in
collaboration with authors of the GBD alcohol methods.
However, it was designed to provide a more accessible tool
and methods for alcohol harm estimation and, as well, to
enable estimation of the effects of changes in alcohol
consumption on rates of alcohol attributable harm. In
addition, we estimated changes in alcohol attributable
mortality and crime using an alternative ARIMA method
based on observed relationships over many decades be-
tween per capita consumption and these outcomes follow-
ing methods used in earlier studies [8].
Methods
The study team identified key policy levers that would
potentially change under the two privatisation scenarios
from comprehensive and systematic literature reviews on
alcohol policy [12, 19] and past evaluations of Systembola-
get [8]: hours and days of trading; average alcohol prices;
minimum available alcohol prices; alcohol advertising and
promotions; and provision of alcohol to young people. We
also considered potential changes in cross-border pur-
chases of alcohol. The two selected scenarios themselves
represent major alternative privatised systems: (i) a more
restrictive one in which alcohol is permitted to be sold
only in privately owned liquor stores and (ii) a more lib-
eral system in which alcohol can be sold in any grocery
store. Estimation of impacts on public health and safety
proceeded through the steps explained below.
Step 1: The extent to which policy levers would change
under privatisation scenarios
We employed comparisons with privatisation experi-
ences in Scandinavia and North America informed by
expert Swedish opinion to estimate the extent to which
outlet density, days and hours of trading, average and
minimum available prices of alcohol and promotions of
all kinds would change under each of the 2 scenarios
(see Table 1 for summary). While there is also evidence
for private liquor stores being less strict in their check-
ing of customer age-IDs and level of intoxication than
are government-owned stores [20], we were unable to
find an empirical basis upon which to estimate the ef-
fects on population consumption and therefore, conser-
vatively, excluded these from the analysis. The studies
used to inform these estimates were drawn from the sys-
tematic reviews identified below in Step 2 as well as the
team’s knowledge of research in alcohol monopoly coun-
tries. In particular, we drew heavily on a systematic re-
view of the impacts of privatisation events on alcohol
sales to identify relevant studies [12] and recent studies
of the impacts of opening increasing numbers of private
liquor stores alongside government stores in the Canad-
ian province of British Columbia [13, 14]. The existence
of the two kinds of stores operating alongside each other
is almost unique and allows direct comparison on issues
such as pricing and trading hours.
Population density of liquor stores
In Scenario 1 we estimated a 3-fold increase in liquor stores
based on Sweden’s recentexperience with privatising phar-
macies and also Canadian experiences of privatisations
[13, 14]. This equates to an additional 10 outlets per
100,000 population. Under Scenario 2 it was assumed that
all of Sweden’s 6900 grocery stores would sell alcohol, equat-
ing to an additional 75 outlets per 100,000 population.
Table 1 The estimated changes in key policy levers in two
privatisation scenarios
Policy Lever Scenario 1 – Private
Liquor Stores
Scenario 2 – Grocery
Stores
Population density
of liquor stores
200% increase 1500% increase
Sunday trading An extra 12 h day added An extra 14 h day added
Extended hours An increase of 44% An increase of 68%
Mean prices Beer + 4.9% Beer + 2.4%
Wine + 6.0% Wine + 3.0%
Spirits + 1.4% Spirits + 0.7%
Minimum prices Beer −19.9% Beer −24.9%
Wine −12.5% Wine −15.6%
Spirits −20.6% Spirits −25.7%
Promotions Half the inverse effect
of a ban
Inverse of effect of a ban
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Days of sale
We assumed the addition of Sunday sales in both sce-
narios with 12 h for Scenario 1 and 14 h for Scenario 2.
Additional operating hours
We assumed specialty stores would open 12 h per day in
Scenario 1 (for 72 versus 50 h, Monday to Saturday = +
44%) based on opening hours of private stores in British
Columbia, Canada and 14 h per day in Scenario 2 based
on trading hours of Swedish grocery stores (for 84 ver-
sus 50 h, Monday to Saturday = + 68%).
Alcohol prices
We assumed small increases in average prices based on
the privatisation of alcohol in Alberta, Canada (4.9%
beer, 6% wine, 1.4% spirits) [13], the clearest case of a
complete privatisation event with estimated impacts on
per capita alcohol consumption identified from our
systematic review. For Scenario 1, we also estimated that
this increase would be counter-acted by larger decreases
in the minimum prices based on a survey of private
versus government liquor store prices at which alcohol
was available in British Columbia, Canada [21] (− 19.9%
beer, − 12.5% wine, − 20.6% spirits). The only published
empirical studies of the impacts of minimum pricing on
consumption come from Canada. The authors had ac-
cess to this price survey of private liquor stores that op-
erate almost uniquely alongside government-controlled
liquor stores permitting price comparisons for cheapest
alcohol brands between the two sources. For Scenario 2,
we drew on data from Washington, USA [22] reporting
how price changes compared in private liquor stores ver-
sus grocery stores following a recent privatisation event.
Based on that study, we estimated that the increase in
mean grocery store prices in Scenario 2 would be half
that in Scenario 1, but that minimum prices would be
25% lower in Scenario 2.
Promotions, advertising and marketing
While comprehensive and systematic reviews consist-
ently identify promotions, advertising and marketing as
important drivers of alcohol consumption [23], especially
among youth, we were unable to identify a method to
quantify the intensity of these activities. Instead, we
elected to use an approach used by Norstrom [8] of ex-
trapolating estimated impacts of an advertising ban on
alcohol consumption. At the present time, there are
considerable restrictions on advertising, marketing and
promotions of alcohol in Sweden, and the monopoly
operates without a profit motive. We estimated an ef-
fect size opposite to that observed for a complete ban
on alcohol advertising in a study of US states [24] for
Scenario 2 and 50% of that for Scenario 1.
Step 2: The independent effect of each policy lever on
recorded per capita alcohol consumption
Comprehensive systematic reviews and, where possible,
meta-analyses, were completed to estimate the effect on
per capita alcohol consumption of the above changes in:
(1) alcohol outlet density, (2) days and hours of alcohol
sale, (3) price and (4) advertising and are reported in full
elsewhere while being briefly summarised here [25].
Quality criteria were applied to select studies with con-
trolled before and after intervention analyses.
Density of liquor outlets
Of 754 relevant articles identified, only four met the qual-
ity inclusion criteria, three of which were population-level
studies [14, 26, 27], the other individual-level [28]. Differ-
ent measures of outlet density ruled out a meta-analysis.
The scale of changes in density estimated to occur under
the two scenarios (200 and 1500% respectively) were sig-
nificantly larger than those reported in two of the identi-
fied studies. We reanalysed data from the other identified
study [15] and found evidence that the effects of increas-
ing outlet density on alcohol consumption obeyed a decay
function such that smaller proportional effects were seen
at higher levels of outlet density that were equivalent to
what was predicted for Systembolaget. This finding was
used to estimate consumption impacts of the different in-
creases in outlet density for the two scenarios.
Days and hours of sale
Of 1514 relevant papers identified, only 7 met the quality
inclusion criteria and were used to formulate the scenarios,
six of which studied days of sale [29–34] and one of which
studied hours of sale [35]. Across-study results were con-
sistent and a meta-analysis indicated that an additional day
of sale was associated with a 3.4% increase in total con-
sumption. Estimates were also made for the effect on per
capita consumption of the additional hours of trading each
day from Monday to Saturday (22 h in Scenario 1, 34 h in
Scenario 2). These were based on the effect size estimated
for the effect of the addition of a whole extra day of trading
assuming, in the absence of other evidence, a decay func-
tion in effect size similar to that for outlet density.
Prices
We took estimates of the price elasticity of demand for
each beverage type (beer, wine and spirits) of − 0.79, −
0.57 and − 0.96 respectively from a Swedish study [36]
and used these to calculate the impact of the change in
mean price on consumption. As no Swedish minimum
price elasticities exist, we applied beverage-specific price
elasticities for changes in the minimum available price of
alcohol, calculated from Saskatchewan, Canada [37] of −
1.387, − 0.511 and − 0.589 respectively.
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Advertising, promotion and marketing
We assumed a direct effect on recorded consumption
under each scenario, based on evidence from [24].
Step 3: The collective impact of all policy levers on total
per capita alcohol consumption
We combined these independent effect estimates for
each policy lever assuming a simple additive effect each
applied to the baseline estimate. Swedish data from 2001
to 2005 [38] was used to estimate substitution between
recorded and unrecorded consumption, resulting in an
estimated elasticity of unrecorded demand of − 0.197.
This figure was combined with the estimated net change
in recorded consumption [10].
Step 4: Estimating the uncertainty around modelled
changes in per capita consumption
To estimate uncertainty around each parameter, we col-
lected standard errors or confidence intervals around
the selected empirical estimates quantifying the relation-
ships between each policy parameter (i.e. outlet density,
days and hours of sale et cetera) and age 15+ per capita
alcohol consumption. We used a Probabilistic Sensitivity
Analysis (PSA) framework to take 10,000 random draws
from the probability distribution around each parameter
and combine obtained values to estimate overall effects
on per capita consumption, as well as for 95% confi-
dence intervals around the estimates of the change in
mean consumptionfor each scenario. Normal distribu-
tions were assumed for each parameter and the analysis
was conducted using Excel, version 16.
Step 5: Impacts on alcohol-related harms under each
scenario
Two alternative analytic approaches were applied to the
estimation of the impacts of changes in per capita con-
sumption of alcohol attributable harms. The first applies
assumptions derived from the international epidemio-
logical literature regarding risk relationships between
consumption and harm for many disease and injury out-
comes. The second bases estimates on observed relation-
ships over many years in Sweden between level of alcohol
consumption and alcohol related harms. Each has strengths
and weaknesses. The purpose was to investigate how sensi-
tive the estimates would be to different analytic approaches.
Method a: InterMAHP alcohol attributable fractions
Using methodological principles based on Global Burden
of Disease studies, e.g. [39], the International Model of
Alcohol Harms and Policies [18] was used to estimate,
Sweden-specific Sweden-specific alcohol-attributable
deaths and hospital stays for an expanded list of conditions
(see Appendix Table 6) were estimated for each of ten popu-
lation subgroups, defined by gender and age (15–
34,35-64,65+) using the internet-based resource InterMAHP
[17]. For a comprehensive description of methods to calcu-
late alcohol-attributable morbidity and mortality, including
treatment of all methods choices used to run InterMAHP,
see Sherk et al. [18]. We used the dose-response relation-
ships from [40] to calculate Swedish AAFs for IHD morbid-
ity and mortality. The InterMAHP default functions and
values for all other conditions were used. The binge drinking
level was defined in Sweden as 60 g/day for both men and
women and the InterMAHP capped relative risk extrapola-
tion method was used.
Method B: ARIMA modelling of Swedish consumption and
harm data
The expected change in harm associated with each of
the 2 scenarios was based on estimates of the recent his-
torical relation between per capita alcohol consumption
and harm summarised in Norstrom and Ramstedt [41].
We focused on a broad range of harm indicators in
order to obtain a comprehensive assessment of the pro-
jected changes in population drinking. We included cir-
rhosis mortality as this is the classical indicator of
harmful effects of chronic heavy consumption, as well as
injury mortality, which is likely to be linked to episodic in-
toxication drinking. Suicide is an extreme self-destructive
behaviour for which alcohol’s direct involvement in any
case is often hard to ascertain but which, in general, is often
influenced by drinking [42]. Assaults and drink driving
represent two important indicators of harm from others’
drinking. Data sources, statistical methods and reported
relationships between alcohol consumption and these out-
comes are detailed elsewhere [43]. ICD-codes for the causes
of death included are listed in Appendix Table 7. Data were
analysed by applying the technique of seasonal ARIMA-
modelling or SARIMA (seasonal autoregressive integrated
moving average model) [44]. Error-correction model-
ling (ECM) was used to explore lagged effects in the re-
lationship between population consumption and liver
cirrhosis [45].
ICD-10 code data to 3 digits (e.g. C00) for 2014 for
all modelled conditions were obtained from the Swedish
Health and Welfare Database (accessed at http://www.so
cialstyrelsen.se/statistics/statisticaldatabase/causeofdeath)
for deaths and the National Board of Health and Welfare
for hospital stays.
Estimating the distribution of alcohol consumption
Swedish survey data were used to estimate: (i) the preva-
lence of lifetime abstainers (≤ 1 drink ever), (ii) the
prevalence of former drinkers (< 1 drink past year), (iii)
the prevalence of current drinkers (≥1 drink past year)
(iv) the prevalence of binge drinkers (> 60 g ethanol/day
at least monthly) and (v) average daily consumption
within the subgroup. Data were obtained from the Swedish
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Council for Information on Alcohol and Other Drugs
(CAN) (prevalence of lifetime abstainers and former
drinkers), the National Prospective Study of Substance Use
and Harm [46] (mean daily consumption by sub-group)
and the CAN Monitor Survey (binge drinking) [11].
These data were combined with Swedish per capita
consumption data to create subgroup-specific per capita
consumption estimates following the methods described
elsewhere [47]. The distribution of drinkers in each sub-
group was calculated using a one-parameter definition of
the Gamma distribution [47]. We assumed a maximum
level of consumption of 250 g ethanol per day correspond-
ing to the mean levels of consumption observed in street-
involved groups of dependent drinkers observed in
Canada [48].
Estimating relative risk curves for alcohol attributable
conditions Conditions for which alcohol consumption
had a causal impact were identified via standardized
methodology [49] (see Appendix Table 6 for summary).
Relative risk curves for these conditions were obtained
from Rehm et al. and are similar to those used in the
WHO 2018 Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health.
To calculate Alcohol Attributable Fractions (AAFs) for
partially alcohol attributable conditions, we used the fol-
lowing general formula:
AAF ¼ P f RRf −1
 þ R 2500:03 P xð Þ RR xð Þ−1½ dx
P f RRf −1
 þ R 2500:03 P xð Þ RR xð Þ−1½  dxþ 1
where Pf is the prevalence of former drinkers, RRfis the
relative risk of former drinkers, P(x) is the prevalence of
drinkers at daily consumption level x and is calculating
using the Gamma distribution, RR(x) is the disease-specific
relative risk at daily consumption level x and 250 g is an
assumed maximum daily consumption level [18].
Changes in the prevalence of “binge” drinking Special
AAFs were calculated for injuries, ischaemic stroke and
ischaemic heart disease that took account of the prevalence
of “binge drinking” as measured by survey data. Estimated
changes from baseline in the prevalence of binge drinking
due to increased consumption in each scenario were
extrapolated from observed relationships between rates
of binge drinking and mean daily consumption across
the 10 age-gender sub-groups.
Wholly alcohol attributable conditions Some condi-
tions (e.g. mental and behavioural disorders due to alco-
hol, ICD10 code F10) are completely, and not partially,
attributable to alcohol (i.e. its AAF = 1.00). For each
population subgroup, an absolute risk function was cali-
brated, assuming a linear form, to match the observed
number of deaths or hospital stays given the initial
distribution of consumption. These functions were com-
bined with the post-intervention distribution of consump-
tion in order to estimate changes in the relevant harm
outcomes under each scenario. See [50] for more details
of the calibration process.
Changes in deaths and hospital stays The percentage
increases in per capita alcohol consumption were applied
to consumption for each subgroup in both scenarios. We
assumed the prevalence of abstainers and former
drinkers would not change. Different distributions of
current drinkers were then calculated using these updated
per capita consumption figures for each scenario. These
updated distributions of consumption were applied to the
AAF formula above and updated AAFs were calculated for
each condition, subgroup and scenario. An adjustment was
also calculated to modify the number of hospital stays (or
deaths) due to this increased consumption, calculated as
AAH1 ¼ H1  AAF1 ¼ H0 1−AAF0ð ÞAAF11−AAF1
where H1 is the number of hospital stays for a condition
under Scenario 1, H0 is number of hospital stays ob-
served in 2014 (base case), and AAF1 and AAF0 are the
AAFs calculated under Scenario 1 and the base case,
respectively.
Statistical analysis InterMAHP v1.0, an open access
SAS-based software program, was used to perform the
data analysis to calculate AAFs [17, 51] which were sub-
sequently used to calculate the number of deaths and
hospital stays that are attributable to alcohol consump-
tion from the total number of recorded deaths and ad-
missions for each condition.
Results
Effects of changes in policy levers on per capita alcohol
consumption
The combined results of Steps 1 to 4 are shown in
Table 2 with estimated effects of each individual policy
change and their combined effects on per capita con-
sumption with 95% confidence intervals.
The estimates for revised levels of total per capita con-
sumption are illustrated in Fig. 1 alongside consumption
levels for 23 European countries in 2010, accessed from
the European Commission public health indicators web-
site (http://ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/indicators_en). As
can be seen, the estimates of consumption under both
scenarios are well within the limits observed for other
European countries with private alcohol retail systems,
such as Denmark and Germany.
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Effects of changes in per capita alcohol consumption on
levels of harms
Estimates from method a: InterMAHP attributable fractions
As shown in Table 3, the 20% increase in per capita
consumption in Scenario 1 is predicted to lead to 763
additional AA deaths per year, an increase of 47% (95%
CIs: 35–59%). The estimated 31.23% increase in per
capita consumption in Scenario 2 is projected to cause
an additional 1234 deaths per year, an increase of 76%
(95% CIs, 60–92%). Alcohol may provide a protective
effect for certain conditions such as hypertension, ischae-
mic heart disease, ischaemic stroke and type 2 diabetes,
although this has been increasingly questioned [52]. This
traditionally assumed protective effect, however, was taken
into account and explains the negative number of AA
deaths for cardiovascular conditions and diabetes.
As shown also in Table 3, in Scenario 1 an additional
10,859 hospital stays per year was estimated, a 29% (95%
CIs: 22–34%) increase. The 31% per capita consumption in-
crease associated with Scenario 2 was projected to lead to
16,118 additional hospital stays due to alcohol per year, a
42% (95% CIs: 35–49%) increase. In both scenarios, the lar-
gest net increase is projected for mental health conditions
followed by injuries, cardiovascular and digestive conditions.
Estimates of increased alcohol-related deaths and hospital
stays under each scenario were also analysed by gender
and three age groups and are reported in Appendix
Tables 8 and 9.
Estimates based on method B: ARIMA modelling
Results of the ARIMA modelling to estimate the rela-
tionships between per capita consumption for five harm
indicators are shown in Table 4, based on analyses re-
ported by Norstrom and Ramstedt [41].
Applying the estimated elasticities in Table 4 to the es-
timated changes in per capita consumption for each sce-
nario resulted in estimates of increased mortality and
crime as shown in Table 5.
Discussion
This paper presents estimates of the public health and
safety impacts of abolishing Systembolaget under two
alternative scenarios. The baseline estimates for Sweden
in 2014 (implied by the changes estimated above) indicate
the extent of existing alcohol-related harm in Sweden with
estimates for 2014 of 2081 deaths and 46,026 hospital stays
being directly attributable to alcohol per year if the con-
tested health benefits of alcohol use are discounted [52].
We demonstrate two methods of estimating increases in
alcohol related harms based on estimated changes in per
capita alcohol consumption under different policy scenar-
ios. These indicate substantial increases in alcohol attribut-
able deaths, crimes and hospital admissions were Sweden
to privatise its liquor monopoly.
In Scenario 1, we assumed Systembolaget stores were re-
placed by privately-owned speciality liquor stores and that an-
nual alcohol consumption would increase by 20.0% from 9.2 l
to 11.1 l per capita as a result. Using the InterMAHP burden
of disease approach, we estimated that Scenario 1 would lead
to 763 additional deaths (+ 47%) and 10,859 additional hos-
pital stays (+ 29%) per year. The ARIMA method provides
alternative estimates for a narrower range of important
alcohol-related harms. Using the ARIMA method, we esti-
mate that each year under Scenario 1 there would be 160
(37.2%) more liver cirrhosis deaths, 399 (21.8%) more deaths
from injuries, 291 (25.5%) more suicides, 17,407 (20.9%) more
assaults and 4669 (33.9%) more drink driving offences.
In Scenario 2 (alcohol sold in privately-owned grocery
stores), we estimate a 31.2% increase in alcohol consump-
tion to an annual total of 12.2 l per capita adult. Using the
InterMAHP methodology, this consumption increase
would lead to 1234 more deaths each year (+ 76%) and
16,118 more hospital stays (+ 42%). Using the ARIMA
method, we estimated there would be 273 (63.7%) more
liver cirrhosis deaths, 660 (36.0%) more deaths from
Fig. 1 Per capita recorded alcohol consumption in 23 European
countries (litres per year)
Table 2 Estimated 95% Confidence Intervals around changes in
recorded per capita consumption for each lever and overall
change in consumption for each scenario
Lever Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Density of outlets 9.47% (7.44–11.58%) 16.43% (14.71–18.19%)
Sunday trading 1.01% (−3.21–5.27%) 1.18% (CI -3.70-6.24%)
Extended opening
hours
3.83% (3.31–4.36%) 4.82% (CI 4.15–5.48%)
Mean price −2.83% (− 3.91%- -1.73%) −1.41% (− 1.96%- -0.88%)
Minimum price 13.34% (10.24–16.44%) 16.67% (12.86–20.55%)
Promotions 2.50% (0.27–4.75%) 5.00% (0.58–9.50%)
Overall change
in per capita
consumption
(recorded &
unrecorded)
19.99% (15.34–24.73%) 31.23% (25.12–37.33%)
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injuries, 485 (42.4%) more suicides, 28,680 (34.4%) more
assaults and 7940 (57.7%) more drink driving offences.
Differences from previous estimates
Norström et al. [8] estimated in the early 2000s the conse-
quences of abolishing the Swedish alcohol monopoly. Des-
pite the use of updated reviews of the published literature
and analyses of recent Swedish data on alcohol-related
harm, there are similarities with both the results and con-
clusions of the last published study by Norström et al. [8].
In both instances it was concluded that the density of liquor
outlets, the hours that liquor stores are open, the average
price of alcoholic products and the effects of marketing and
promotion activities all have the potential to influence levels
of alcohol consumption and related harms. Since the earlier
report, there has been new research on floor or minimum
prices. In the present exercise we estimate that while privat-
isation may slightly increase the average price of alcohol,
this is more than offset by the effects on alcohol consump-
tion of a reduction in the prices of the cheapest alcohol. In
relation to impacts of all effects of privatisation on popula-
tion consumption of alcohol, we estimated a larger impact
for Scenario 1 (specialty liquor stores) than in Norström et
al. [8] and a slightly smaller impact for Scenario 2 (gro-
cery stores). The estimated changes in per capita alco-
hol consumption under each scenario are also well
within the range reported in the main systematic review
of privatisation events conducted by the US Centers for
Disease Control [12], namely a median increase of 44.4%
and range from 0 to 305%.
Limitations and uncertainties
We acknowledge a range of factors that may have led us to
overestimate, underestimate or have uncertain effects on
our estimates. We assumed a simple additive effect such
that the overall effect of the various policy changes is the
sum of the individual effects as estimated from the pub-
lished literature. There is only a small literature regarding
how in practice the effects of policies are altered when they
are introduced in combination. Studies from the US [53],
Table 3 The estimated impacts of each privatisation scenario on alcohol-related harm based on the International Model of Alcohol
Harms and Policies
Harm measure Total Sweden 2014 Scenario 1 extraa (95% CIs) Scenario 2 extraa (95% CIs)
Alcohol attributable deaths
Cancers 712 138 (106, 172) 219 (175, 263)
Mental health 243 50 (40, 59) 70 (59, 78)
Cardiovascular − 452 305 (226, 391) 516 (398, 641)
Digestive 394 134 (100, 169) 220 (172, 270)
Injuries 651 119 (91, 145) 183 (147, 215)
Infectious diseases 80 17 (13, 22) 27 (22, 33)
Type 2 diabetes −133 −6 (−5, −7) −9 (−7, − 10)
Total deaths: N (95% 1629 763 (576–957) 1234 (974, 1501)
CIs) % Change (95% CIs) – + 47% (35, 59%) + 76% (60, 92%)
Alcohol attributable hospital stays
Cancers 3068 668 (509, 832) 1060 (846, 1277)
Mental health 28,172 5635 (4513, 6661) 7874 (6741, 8807)
Cardiovascular − 7934 1574 (1193, 1970) 2525 (2002, 3053)
Digestive 1972 550 (415, 693) 896 (705, 1094)
Injuries 10,565 1928 (1478, 2361) 2973 (2398, 3507)
Infectious diseases 2249 503 (385, 623) 790 (633, 947)
Type 2 diabetes − 373 −12 (−9, −14) −16 (− 14, − 18)
Total stays: N (95% CIs) 38,091 10,859 (8493, 13,140) 16,118 (13,325, 18,685)
% Change (95% CIs) – + 29% (22, 34%) + 42% (35, 49%)
aCalculated as percentage change in alcohol attributable conditions
Table 4 Estimated effects of per capita alcohol consumption
(litres of ethanol) on harm rates in Sweden, 1987 to 2015
Elasticity estimatea 95% CIs
Cirrhosis 0.170 0.124–0.215
Suicide 0.122 0.071–0.174
Injuries 0.106 0.018–0.194
Assaults 0.102 0.081–0.122
Drink driving 0.157 0.086–0.228
aThe proportional change in a harm indicator for a 1 l increase in per capita
alcohol consumption
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Australia [54] and Canada [15] suggest that the combined
effects of introducing two or more policies at the same time
is a sub-additive effect on alcohol consumption i.e. the
combined impact is less than the sum of the individual pol-
icy impacts. However, Norström et al. [8] argued that a
multiplicative model is more applicable. In the absence of
conclusive evidence, we took the middle course of assum-
ing a simple additive model. Given the complexity and
range of estimates reported in this paper and the absence
of an empirical basis upon which to conduct a sub- additive
model, we elected not to present sensitivity analyses here.
Our models follow the standard WHO GBD assumption
that alcohol is protective in low doses for some cardiovascu-
lar conditions as well as type 2 diabetes. However, this as-
sumption is being increasingly questioned for all-cause
mortality [48], for cardiovascular disease [52] and type 2 dia-
betes [55] so we may have underestimated the net extent of
alcohol-related harm in Sweden. There are also other gen-
eral limitations to be acknowledged in relation to the widely
used attributable fraction method. While Sweden specific at-
tributable fractions were calculated based on systematic re-
views of the international literature and meta-analyses
describing risk relationships between alcohol consumption
and diseases, it is possible that these risk relationships are
different in Sweden. It should be noted, however, that the at-
tributable fraction method relies on survey data on Swedish
drinking patterns and also official Swedish data on the
prevalence of potentially alcohol attributable diseases and in-
juries. A significant further limitation was that we only for-
mally estimated confidence intervals around our estimates
of alcohol consumption change and not around our esti-
mates of how this translated into changes into alcohol at-
tributable morbidity and mortality. Confidence intervals
around estimates from the ARIMA models are shown in
Table 4 but were not used to calculate the confidence inter-
vals around our final estimates of changes in harm. Also, the
time of writing, InterMAHP (Sherk et al., 2018) does not in-
clude a function to calculate confidence intervals. This will
be addressed in a future version. It is likely, therefore, that
the reported confidence intervals here are conservative.
We were unable to find an empirical basis upon which to
estimate the effects on population consumption of the
established tendency for private liquor stores to be less
strict in their checking of customer age-IDs and level of in-
toxication than is the case in government-owned stores
[20]. Neither did we take account of increased frequency of
exposure for consumers to alcohol marketing and purchas-
ing opportunities when visiting grocery stores for other
items. We were also not able to include some 100% alcohol
caused deaths e.g. cases of alcoholic gastritis from the gen-
eral category of gastritis. These issues may have caused the
estimates to underestimate the true impact of the changes.
While we acknowledge these various sources of possibly
upward or downward bias in our estimation methods, a
comparison with levels of consumption in other European
countries shows that Sweden currently tends to have
lower consumption than countries where alcohol distribu-
tion is fully privatised. In particular, we note per capita
consumption levels of between 11 and 12 l per person
aged 15+ in neighbouring Denmark and Germany which
suggests our estimates are quite plausible. Furthermore,
our estimates are based on the best-available evidence,
draw on robust analytical methods and were subjected to
examination of uncertainty.
Implications for Swedish alcohol policy
Our results suggest abolishing Systembolaget would lead
to significant increases in alcohol consumption and in
Table 5 Estimated impacts of each privatisation scenario on alcohol-related harm based on ARIMA analyses of Swedish time series
data
Harm measure Total Sweden 2014 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
N, % (95% CIs) N, % (95% CIs)
Alcoholic cirrhosis deaths 429 160 (111–211) 273 (186–371)
+ 37.2% (25.9–45.2%) + 63.7% (43.3–86.5%)
Injury deaths 1833 399 (61–797) 660 (96–1384)
+ 21.8% (3.3–45.5%) + 36.0% (5.3–75.5%)
Suicide deaths 1142 291 (161–436) 485 (261–750)
+ 25.5%) + 42.4% (22.9–65.6%)
Total deaths 3404 850 (334–1444) 1418 (543–2505)
+ 25.0% (9.8–42.4%)) + 41.7% (16.0–73.6%)
Assault crimes 83,324 17,407 (13,549-21,225) 28,680 (22,063-35,369)
+ 20.9% (16.3–25.5) + 34.4% (26.5–42.4%)
Drink-driving 13,769 4669 (2388-7273) 7940 (3900-12,903)
+ 33.9% (17.3–52.8%) + 57.7% (28.3%93.7%)
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the health and (some) social problems caused by alcohol.
This is the case in both of the scenarios we examined
which cover more or less restrictive visions of privatisa-
tion. This is because privatisation typically leads to a re-
duction in the minimum price charged for alcohol, an
increase in the number of outlets selling alcohol, an in-
crease the trading hours of those outlets and increased
promotion and marketing of alcohol.
In theory it is possible to implement policies which would
mitigate these effects and thereby prevent an increase in
alcohol-related harms following privatisation. In practice,
this has proved difficult to achieve in other countries with
privatised alcohol markets as the number of commercial
actors within the policy-making process tends to be both
more numerous and effective in their lobbying efforts than
in monopoly states. This has tended to stifle efforts to im-
plement effective alcohol control policies and, conversely,
has facilitated deregulatory measures that increase the po-
tential for harmful public health consequences. The UK’s
experience with minimum unit pricing for alcohol illus-
trates this point. Industry-led legal battles, for example, de-
layed the Scottish Parliament’s 2012 decision to introduce
minimum unit pricing by six years [56]. By contrast, gov-
ernment alcohol monopoly jurisdictions can both introduce
and modify all liquor prices at will by regulation with min-
imal delays (e.g. [37]). Given this and other experiences, it
should not be assumed that a privatised market can be or
will be straightforwardly and effectively regulated.
A government monopoly, especially one like Systembola-
get with an explicit public health mandate, may be an ideal
vehicle for enabling evidence-based alcohol policies to be im-
plemented in the public interest. Nonetheless, we suggest
Systembolaget could be used to generate further improved
outcomes by having its policies strengthened in some areas
e.g. by introducing an explicit minimum price per standard
drink (12 g ethanol) for all alcoholic beverages indexed to
the cost of living. It is possible to have both relatively high
average prices for alcohol alongside quite low minimum
prices, which is currently the case in Sweden. Thus setting
minimum prices per standard drink and indexing these to
the cost of living would further improve public health out-
comes. In addition, any policy that increases competition in
the alcohol market in Sweden is likely to have an adverse ef-
fect on public health and safety by driving down minimum
prices even further and by increasing access, especially to
under-aged drinkers. If Swedes wish to have an alcohol mon-
opoly as an efficient tool to reduce harms, it is also import-
ant to not erode it through seemingly minor exceptions e.g.
allowing alcohol sales via the Internet or permitting the sale
of alcohol at farms, something currently being proposed.
Recommendations for future research
Finally, we suggest that the research basis upon which es-
timates of the public health and safety impacts of alcohol
policy changes are made needs to be strengthened. We
highlight in particular the need for improved estimates of
the risk relationships between alcohol use and disease
based on longitudinal studies that control for different
sources of lifetime selection bias e.g. bias caused by com-
paring risks for current versus former drinkers [57]. Simi-
larly, improved methods are needed to estimate more
precisely the relationships between drinking patterns in a
population and the rate of acute alcohol-related harms.
In addition, a larger pool of well-controlled studies of
the public health and safety impacts of abrupt changes
in alcohol policies is needed, including studies which
examine the interplay between multiple policy changes.
An improved evidence base in each of these areas will
support more precise estimates of the potential impact
of hypothetical policy changes in a given jurisdiction.
Conclusions
New understandings about how the distribution of alcohol
consumption changes in a population as total consumption
changes can be used also to help estimate changes in alco-
hol attributable harm under different policy scenarios. In
depth studies of the relationship between per capita alcohol
consumption and related harms in a country over many
years can also be used for this same purpose. In the case of
modelling estimated changes in alcohol related mortality as
a result of privatising the Swedish government alcohol
monopoly, the two methods produced broadly similar esti-
mates of increased alcohol attributable harms. Confidence
in this conclusion is supported by the degree of conver-
gence in the estimates of increased harm from two quite
different theoretical and methodological approaches. Al-
though we have modelled the uncertainties due to random
variation and presented these in our range of estimates, we
have not modelled the impact of changing the assumptions
upon which the model is based, and these may have a larger
impact on the outcomes predicted by the model than the
impacts of random variation.
While both privatisation scenarios considered resulted in
substantial increases in alcohol consumption, attributable
crime, hospitalisation and death, the largest increase was
estimated for the sale of alcohol in grocery stores. We also
conclude that improved health and safety outcomes could
be achieved were Systembolaget to introduce still stronger
policies, especially in the area of alcohol pricing. With in-
creasing trends towards privatisation of alcohol control and
distributions systems in North America, these estimates
may also be a cautionary tale for policy makers in other full
or partial alcohol monopoly jurisdictions. Increased govern-
ment control over the distribution and sale of alcohol is
also an option for countries with fully privatised systems to
consider as an effective means of reducing alcohol-related
harms.
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Appendix
Table 6 Three digit ICD-10 codes corresponding to alcohol attributable conditions used in GBD WHO method (Method A)
Major Category Condition ICD-10 code
Infectious diseases Tuberculosis A15 to A19
HIV B20 to B24
Lower respiratory tract infections J09 to J22
Cancer Oropharyngeal cancer C00 to C14
Oesophageal cancer C15
Colorectal cancer C18 to C21
Liver cancer C22
Pancreatic cancer C25
Laryngeal cancer C32
Breast cancer C50
Type 2 diabetes Type 2 Diabetes mellitus E11, E14
Mental health conditions Mental and behavioural disorders due to alcohol F10
Epilepsy G40 to G41
Cardiovascular conditions Hypertensive disease / hypertension I10 to I15
Ischaemic heart disease I20 to I25
Cardiac arrhythmia I47 to I49
Heart failure and complications of heart disease I50 to I52
Ischaemic stroke I63, I65 to I67
Haemorrhagic stroke CI60 to I62
Digestive conditions Cirrhosis of the liver K70, K74
Acute pancreatitis K85
Injuries* Unintentional injuries Begins with V or W, X00 to X59, Y40 to Y86, Y88, Y89
Intentional self-harm X60 to X84
Assault/homicide X85 to Y09
*ICD10 codes for injury hospital stays appear in an additional diagnosis category called “external cause of injury.” To be included, the primary diagnosis must have
an ICD10 code in S00 to S99, T00 to T77, T79
Table 7 Causes of death and police-reported offences used in Method B
ICD9 ICD10
Deaths
Alcoholic liver disease 571.0–571.3 K70-K70.4, K70.9
Suicide E950-E959 X60-X84, (except X65) Y87.0
Injuries. Composite measure comprising:
Drowning injuries E910 W65-W74
Fall injuries E880-E888, E848 W00-W19
Fire injuries E890-E899 X00-X09
Motor-vehicle traffic crashes E810-E819 V02-V04, V12-V14, V20-V79, V89.2
Undetermined E980–E989 Y10–Y34,Y87.2,Y89.9
Police-reported offences
Assaults
Drink driving
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Table 8 Estimated number of alcohol-attributable deaths in Sweden under Scenarios 1 and 2, by disease category, age group and
gender
Male Female Total
AAD Scen1 Scen2 AAD Scen1 Scen2 AAD Scen1 Scen2
Cancers 15–34 2 3 3 2 3 3 4 6 6
35–64 143 174 192 78 96 106 221 270 298
65+ 341 402 438 146 173 188 487 575 626
Subtotal 486 579 633 226 271 297 712 850 930
Mental health conditions 15–34 2 3 3 1 1 1 3 4 4
35–64 73 87 93 26 31 33 99 118 126
65+ 115 138 148 27 33 35 142 171 183
Subtotal 190 228 244 54 65 69 244 293 313
Cardiovascular conditions 15–34 4 5 6 2 3 4 6 8 10
35–64 72 141 183 16 35 48 88 176 231
65+ −211 −81 11 − 335 −250 − 188 − 546 − 331 − 177
Subtotal − 135 65 200 − 317 − 212 − 137 −452 −147 63
Digestive conditions 15–34 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 2 2
35–64 163 241 291 64 77 86 227 318 377
65+ 100 132 154 66 76 83 166 208 237
Subtotal 265 374 446 129 154 168 394 528 614
Injuries 15–34 172 197 210 32 37 40 204 234 250
35–64 218 256 277 44 52 57 262 308 334
65+ 145 177 194 41 51 56 186 228 250
Subtotal 535 630 681 116 140 153 651 770 834
Infectious diseases 15–34 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
35–64 6 7 8 2 3 3 8 10 11
65+ 48 59 65 23 28 31 71 87 96
Subtotal 55 67 74 25 31 34 80 98 108
Type 2 diabetes 15–34 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
35–64 2 3 3 −9 −10 −10 −7 −7 −7
65+ 10 12 13 − 136 −144 − 147 −126 − 132 − 134
Subtotal 13 15 16 − 146 − 154 − 158 − 133 − 139 − 142
Total for all conditions 15–34 182 211 225 36 44 48 218 255 273
35–64 676 909 1048 219 284 323 895 1193 1371
65+ 549 839 1022 − 168 −34 56 381 805 1078
Subtotal 1408 1958 2294 87 294 427 1495 2252 2721
NB: Rows and columns may not add exactly due to rounding. AAD = alcohol-attributable deaths. Scen1 = predicted increase in deaths in Scenario 1. Scen2 =
predicted increase in deaths in Scenario 2
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Table 9 Estimated number of alcohol-attributable hospital stays in Sweden under Scenarios 1 and 2, by disease category, age group
and gender
Male Female Total
AAH Scen1 Scen2 AAH Scen1 Scen2 AAH Scen1 Scen2
Cancers 15 to 34 29 35 36 30 38 43 59 73 79
35 to 64 800 952 999 591 734 819 1391 1686 1818
65+ 1079 1234 1283 540 646 707 1619 1880 1990
Subtotal 1908 2221 2318 1160 1417 1569 3068 3638 3887
Mental health conditions 15 to 34 2793 3216 3321 1920 2313 2473 4713 5529 5794
35 to 64 14,042 16,287 16,841 4792 5765 6155 18,834 22,052 22,996
65+ 3685 4287 4438 939 1129 1208 4624 5416 5646
Subtotal 20,520 23,790 24,600 7652 9207 9837 28,172 32,997 34,437
Cardio-vascular conditions 15 to 34 139 164 172 33 53 65 172 217 237
35 to 64 340 728 845 − 891 − 682 − 550 − 551 46 295
65+ − 2296 − 1825 − 1676 − 5258 − 5072 − 4932 − 7554 − 6897 − 6608
Subtotal − 1818 − 933 − 659 − 6117 − 5701 − 5417 − 7935 − 6634 − 6076
Digestive conditions 15 to 34 140 170 179 68 119 158 208 289 337
35 to 64 904 1095 1155 267 362 425 1171 1457 1580
65+ 452 521 543 141 164 181 593 685 724
Subtotal 1496 1785 1877 476 646 763 1972 2431 2640
Injuries 15 to 34 2765 3076 3175 1312 1542 1665 4077 4618 4840
35 to 64 2822 3210 3324 1008 1214 1329 3830 4424 4653
65+ 1651 1925 2008 1008 1230 1358 2659 3155 3366
Subtotal 7237 8210 8508 3328 3986 4352 10,565 12,196 12,860
Infectious diseases 15 to 34 164 195 204 108 136 153 272 331 357
35 to 64 430 507 531 209 255 282 639 762 813
65+ 922 1075 1122 416 502 551 1338 1577 1673
Subtotal 1516 1777 1857 733 894 987 2249 2671 2844
Type 2 diabetes 15 to 34 2 2 2 −11 −12 −12 −9 −10 −10
35 to 64 26 30 31 −123 − 128 − 130 −97 −98 −99
65+ 30 33 34 − 297 −313 −321 − 267 − 280 −287
Subtotal 58 65 68 −431 − 453 − 463 −373 −388 − 395
Total for all conditions 15 to 34 6031 6857 7089 3459 4190 4545 9490 11,047 11,634
35 to 64 19,364 22,807 23,727 5852 7520 8331 25,216 30,327 32,058
65+ 5522 7251 7753 − 2511 − 1714 − 1248 3011 5537 6505
Subtotal 30,917 36,915 38,569 6801 9997 11,628 37,718 46,912 50,197
NB: rows and columns may not add exactly due to rounding. AAH = alcohol-attributable hospital stays. Scen1 = predicted increase in hospital stays in Scenario 1.
Scen2 = predicted increase in hospital stays in Scenario 2
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Table 10 Estimated number of alcohol-attributable deaths in Sweden under Scenarios 1 and 2, by age group and gender for sub-
groups of conditions with or without some assumed protection from alcohol
Male Female Total
AAD Scen1 Scen2 AAD Scen1 Scen2 AAD Scen1 Scen2
Sub-total for conditions with no protection 15 to 34 178 206 219 35 41 44 213 247 263
35 to 64 603 765 861 214 259 285 817 1024 1146
65+ 749 908 999 303 361 393 1052 1269 1392
Subtotal 1531 1878 2078 550 661 721 2081 2539 2799
Sub-total for conditions with some protection 15 to 34 4 5 6 1 2 3 5 7 9
35 to 64 74 144 186 7 25 38 81 169 224
65+ −201 −69 24 − 471 − 394 −335 − 672 −463 − 311
Subtotal −122 80 216 −463 −366 − 295 − 585 − 286 −79
Net total deaths for all conditions 15 to 34 182 211 225 36 44 48 218 255 273
35 to 64 676 909 1048 219 284 323 895 1193 1371
65+ 549 839 1022 −168 −34 56 381 805 1078
Subtotal 1408 1958 2294 87 294 427 1495 2252 2721
NB: rows and columns may not add exactly due to rounding. AAD = alcohol-attributable deaths. Scen1 = predicted increase in hospital stays in Scenario 1. Scen2
= predicted increase in hospital stays in Scenario 2
Table 11 Estimated number of alcohol-attributable hospital stays in Sweden under Scenarios 1 and 2, by age group and gender for
sub-groups of conditions with or without some assumed protection from alcohol
Male Female Total
AAH Scen1 Scen2 AAH Scen1 Scen2 AAH Scen1 Scen2
Sub-total for conditions with no protection 15 to 34 5891 6692 6915 3438 4148 4492 9329 10,840 11,407
35 to 64 18,998 22,051 22,850 6867 8330 9010 25,865 30,381 31,860
65+ 7789 9042 9394 3044 3671 4005 10,833 12,713 13,399
Subtotal 32,677 37,783 39,160 13,349 16,150 17,508 46,026 53,933 56,668
Sub-total for conditions with some protection 15 to 34 141 166 174 22 41 53 163 207 227
35 to 64 366 758 876 − 1014 −810 −680 − 648 −52 196
65+ − 2266 − 1792 − 1642 − 5555 − 5385 − 5253 − 7821 − 7177 − 6895
Subtotal − 1760 − 868 − 591 − 6548 − 6154 − 5880 − 8308 − 7022 − 6471
Net total stays for all conditions 15 to 34 6031 6857 7089 3459 4190 4545 9490 11,047 11,634
35 to 64 19,364 22,807 23,727 5852 7520 8331 25,216 30,327 32,058
65+ 5522 7251 7753 −2511 −1714 −1248 3011 5537 6505
Subtotal 30,917 36,915 38,569 6801 9997 11,628 37,718 46,912 50,197
NB: rows and columns may not add exactly due to rounding. AAH = alcohol-attributable hospital stays. Scen1 = predicted increase in hospital stays in Scenario 1.
Scen2 = predicted increase in hospital stays in Scenario 2
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